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Mayes: Mayes: Constitutional Restrictions
TERMINATION OF UTILITY SERVICES
V. CONCLUSION

Absent agreement between the parties, determination of state and
local employees' bargaining units has been left to the discretion of the
State Board of Mediation. Although it is difficult to tell how effective this
arrangement has been, few complaints have been voiced. As public employment swells' 60 and becomes more organized, however, it is questionable
if the Board's machinery and procedure will be sufficient. The Legislature,
with the aid of a special commission to make recommendations,' 61 should
study the problem and establish the Missouri public policy in this area
62
more specifically.
ROSS ESHELMAN

CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON TERMINATION OF
SERVICES BY PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITIES
I. INTRODUCTON

Recent years have witnessed a definite judicial trend towards expanding
the impact of 14th amendment procedural due process. Procedural due
process requires that states, or entities acting under color of state law, give
notice and an impartial hearing to certain classes of adversely affected parties
prior to the termination of privileges, benefits, services, entitlements, or
rights.' This comment will consider whether privately owned public utilities,
particularly in Missouri, engage in "state action" or act under "color" of state
law, thus requiring them to extend to their subscribers the procedural due
process protections mandated by the 14th amendment.2 To the extent state
action exists, the scope and nature of these constitutional requirements will
be examined.
160. For an exhaustive study of probable increases in state and local employment generally see R. EHRENBERG, THE DEMAND FOR STATE AND LocAL Gov(1972).
161. Special commissions have been used in several states. For a discussion
of some of the results see Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public

ERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MicH. L. Rv. 891
(1969).
162. See text accompanying notes 142-44 supra.

1. Note, Constitutional Law-Public Utilities-The State Action and Due

Process Doctrines, 14 B.C. IND. &COM. L. REv. 317 (1972).

2. Private parties wishing to assert rights protected by the fourteenth
amendment usually bring their actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).

Section 1983 was enacted under the authority of the fourteenth amendment; it

provides private parties with remedies for violations of the fourteenth amend-

ment by actions taken by authorities under "color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory." Although the language of
§ 1988 appears broader than the language in the fourteenth amendment, which

refers only to the "state," the Supreme Court has held that in cases under § 1983,

"under color" of law "has consistently been treated as the same thing as the state

action under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 n.7 (1966). See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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II. ThE PLIGHT OF THE UTILITY SuBsCRaIER
Existing Missouri law provides little protection for the privately owned
public utility subscriber who is threatened with termination of service for
a mistaken or unjust reason. For example, consider the subscriber who
believes his latest bill overcharges him. He has three traditional remedies:
he can either sue to enjoin the utility from terminating service, wait until
services are terminated and then sue the utility in tort for the resulting
damage, or pay the charges under protest and sue for a refund.4 The problem with these traditional approaches is that the amounts of money at stake
are usually small but the cost of litigation is high. Furthermore, most individuals are wary of challenging a large public utility with its full arsenal
of legal remedies and virtually unlimited resources. It is no wonder that, as
a practical matter, disputes over small sums are not litigated 5
A potential alternative for the subscriber might be to seek the assistance
of the Missouri Public Service Commission (hereinafter PSC). The PSC's
Rules of Practice and Procedure provide for formal and informal complaints.6 The effectiveness of these administrative remedies is limited, however. There is no assurance that the PSC will act on an informal complaint,
and it is problematic for a subscriber to find the requisite 24 subscribers
to join him in a formal complaint. In addition, the general public is unaware
of the existence of the PSC's Rules of Practice and Procedure. In short, a
subscriber may have no effective means to challenge a utility's termination
of his service. The obvious result of this impotence is that the subscriber
will often 7pay his bills to preserve a necessary service, though convinced
it is unfair.

680 (6th Cir. 1964); Simlins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 828 F.2d 959
54th Cir. 1968); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 804 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 871 U.S. 911 (1962); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 581
(5th Cir. 1960); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.),
cert, denied, 826 U.S. 721 (1945).
8. Mo. PuB. SERV. COLMN GEN. ORDER No. 20, R. 11, provides for discontinuance of service for violation of a utility rule. The most common violation
is the nonpayment of charges for service. This comment will deal with nonpayment of charges as the sole reason for terminations of service, although there are
other reasons for which service may be terminated.
4. Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 62 (D. Minn. 1972).
5. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F. 2d 158 (6th Cir. 1978).
6. Mo. Pun. Snv. ComnhN R. Pnoc. 8. Informal complaints may be made

by any person, either verbally or in writing, and "shall be disposed of as the
Commission may determine." Id. at 8.01. The PSC will entertain formal complaints
about the reasonableness of utility charges only if the complaint is signed by the
mayor or other executive officer of the legislative body of a political subdivision

within which the complaint is generated, or by not less than 25 utility subscribers. Id. at 8.02. If a formal complaint states facts upon which relief can be

granted, the PSC serves the utility with an order requiring it to satisfy the com-

plaint or answer why it cannot be satisfied. Id.

7. For a discussion of the unfortunate situation of the utility subscriber in

the state of Washington see Comment, The Shutoff of Utility Services For Nonpayment: Plight of the Poor, 46 WAs. L. REv. 745 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/5
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III. '"E rrrr Ms'rs": A NEw Foimu

OF PROPERTY

A. In General

The 14th amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"no state shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law ... ." This has been construed to extend to an aggrieved
party the "right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss
of any kind."8 In recent years 14th amendment due process protection has
been expanded in civil, 9 as well as criminal, 10 areas of the law, particularly
in the expansion of the concept of property beyond traditionally recognized
common law property rights.1 1 Today, 14th amendment procedural due
process protects more and different types of property.
One such new form of property is known as "entitlements,"' 2 first
recognized by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly.13 An entitlement is
a judicially determined property right arising from the relationship between
the state and an individual,' 4 created when a state confers a particular
status on an individual. 15
The characterization of a status, or a relationship with government,
as an entitlement has led to the development of the so-called Goldberg
rationale. 16 The Goldberg rationale holds that once the state has undertaken
to provide a service or extend a benefit to an individual, it must comply
with the requirements of 14th amendment due process prior to its termination.' 7 The Goldberg rationale "provides the individual with his only line
of defense against arbitrary withdrawal by the state of his access to what,
although initially not his right to demand, he has become dependent upon."18

8. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951).
9. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Willner v.
Committee on Character &Fitness, 873 U.S. 96 (1963).
10. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

11. Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process Into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type
of Property... In Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. Bxv. 502, 504 (1971).

12. 897 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
13. Id.

14. Comment, The EmergingConstitutionalIssues in Public Utility Consumer
Law, 24 U. FLA. L. lEv. 744, 747 (1972). For a comprehensive discussion of
status as a property right see Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
15. Reich, supra note 14, at 783.

The valuables dispensed by government take many forms, but they all
share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional
forms of wealth-forms which are held as private property. .

.

. The

wealth of more and more Americans depends upon a relationship to
government.
16. Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317, 320 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
17. Bronson v. Consol. Edison, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
18. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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Examples of various relationships between individuals and government
that have been held to be entitlements include welfare benefits, 19 drivers
licenses, 20 occupational licenses, 21 governmental contracts, 22 public housing,23
and unemployment compensation.24 The concept of an25 entitlement betokens

a "sort of right to exist in society, a personal right.....

B. Public Utility Services as Entitlements
Because American life style is dependent on utility services and the
assurance they will not be terminated arbitrarily, 26 it is logical to suggest
that these services be treated as entitlements. 27 There is no marketplace of
utility services from which an individual may choose, but only a single
supplier for any individual subscriber. This means that the individual, when
negotiating -with a utility, has no bargaining power, not even, in the present
urban environment, the option of doing without.28
Courts have acknowledged that gas 29 and water 0 services are entitle-

ments based on their importance to health and comfort.31 By analogy sewer
and electrical services would seem to be entitlements though no case has
yet so held. Telephone services present a more difficult question because
they normally do not fulfill such basic human needs as do the other
services. Yet there are situations in which persons are dependent on telephones for employment or to summon emergency aid. Whether the courts
will find telephone service an entitlement is unclear and admits of some
doubt.3 2 Although entitlements in most instances involve services provided
19. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
20. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).

21. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).

22. Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
28. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
24. California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
25. Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
26. Comment, supra note 14, at 748.
27. Id. at 747.

28. Re: Guarantee and Deposit Rules and Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R.

9N.S.) 439, 443 (Wisc. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935). There can be little doubt that
e availability of heat, light, water, and sanitation is necessary to ensure ade-

quate public health and to maintain a minimum "quality" of life.

29. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
30. Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
31. The court in Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co,, 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio
1972), said there was:

[N]o doubt whatever that the consequences of shutting off gas service

inflicts hardships upon the consumer that far transcend the loss of driving

privileges [citation omitted], delay in paying unemployment compensa-

tion [citation omitted], or even the denial of direct relief payments

[citation omitted]. A person can freeze to death or die of pneumonia
much more quickly than he can starve to death. Thus there is no question
of the entitlement involved.
Id. at 244.
32. See Boykin v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 440 (N.J. Bd.
Pub. Util. 1971), noting that '[O]ne cannot ordinarily function in this day and

age without a phone. Its use in emergency is vital." Id. at 443. But see Holt v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 11 P.U.R.8d 50 (Mass. Dept. Pub. Util. 1955),

holding that telephone service is not a property right, the deprivation of which is

subject to either the United States or the Massachusetts Constitution.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/5
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by government, they may be found to exist in a purely private context like
the sale of services by a privately owned utility.3 3
No matter how necessary to life a utility service may be, access to it is
limited to those who are able to pay. There is no recognized right to free
utility service.3 4 ,
IV. STATE ACTION

A. In General
Assuming that privately owned public utility services are property for
14th amendment purposes, does the utility's action in terminating service
constitute state action or action under color of state law? The 14th amendment, of course, is inapplicable to private actions8 5
, The courts have foind state action to exist in a variety of contexts. An
obvious but little encountered one is the company town in which a private
entity..establishes and operates a town, performing the public functions
normally associated with a municipal government.36 A more common one
is the performance of functions governmental in nature by private persons.37
A third context is private activity which is substantially controlled or regu38

lated by the state.
No comprehensive definition of state action has been developed.3 9 The
Supren, Court, however, has indicated some of the factors it considers
determinatiye of state action. 'W]hen authority derives in part from
government's thumb on,the scale, the exercise of that power becomes
closely akin, in some respects,, to its exercise by government itself."40 In
Evans v_. Nuton4 1 the Supreme Court ,elaborated on the role that public
regulation plays in making a private person or entity's conduct state action
or actiomunder color,of state law:,

83. See, e.g., Palmer, v. Columbia Gas, Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio
1972).

34. Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 62 (D. Minn. 1972).

35. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
86. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Food Employees Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); but see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972).
37. Borman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). In
Bornmn' state action was found to exist when a privately owned transit company
operating urider a franchise granted by a municipal corporation issued segregated
seating regulations. See also American Comm. Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339
U.S. 882 '(1950); Steel v.. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,, 323 U.S. 192 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Kissinger v. New York Transit Authority,
274 F. Supp7439 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).

38. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 843 U.S. 451 (1952).

39. Burton v. -Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1960), states:
[T] o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state respon,sibility . . is an,'impossible task' which 'this court hasnever attempted'
Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious

involvement of the 'state in private conduct be attributed to its true

significance.
Id. at 722, quoting Kotch v. River Port Comm'rs, 830 U.S. 552, (1948).

40. American Comm. Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 882, 401 (1950).
41. 382 U.S. 296 (1972).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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Conduct that is formerly private may become so entwined with
governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental
character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations
placed on state actions .... That is to say, when private individuals or groups are endowed by the state with powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities
42
of the state and subject to its constitutional limitations.
B. Privately Owned Public Utilities as State Actors
To date the United States Supreme Court has not dealt squarely with
the issue whether a privately owned public utility acts under color of state
law. The lower courts, however, have had several opportunities to examine
the relationship between the utility and the state. The Eighth Circuit, in
Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co.,43 has taken a lead in this regard. The
city of St. Paul granted Northern States its operating franchise, received
a franchise fee of five percent of gross earnings, and approved the utility's
regulations. 44 The court, through application of a multifactored test,45 found
that Northern States acted under color of state law.4 6 Important indicatiobs
of state action, the court suggested, were: (1) Is the utility subject to close
regulation by a statutorily created body; (2) must it file its regulations with.
an administrative agency as a condition precedent to operation; (3) must
the regulations be approved by the administrative agency to be effective;
(4) is the entity given a total or partial monoply under color of state law;
(5) does the administrative agency control the rates charged by the entity;
(6) are the actions of the entity subject to review by an administrative
agency; and (7) can the administrative agency permit the entity to perform
acts which it could not otherwise perform without violating state law?47
Ihrke emphasized in particular that the city government received a five
percent fee based on the utility's gross profits, and thus was a beneficiary
of the utility's collection procedures. 48 This fact, in conjunction with the
monopoly status granted the utility, made it "abundantly clear" to the
court that the utility acted under color of state law.49

42. Id. at 299.
43. 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). Ihrke
was vacated as moot because plaintiff moved from the area the utility served
and ceased to be a direct subscriber. Id. at 571. The Eighth Circuit, however,
decided the case as an exception to the mootness doctrine because it was a
case with a question of recurring public interest. Id. Although Ihrke has no
stare decisis effect it is reasonable to assume the Eighth Circuit would reach the
same holding on the same or similar facts.
44. Id. at 570.
45. This multifactored test was first proposed in a concurring opinion by
judge Kemer in Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
46. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir.),
vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972).
47. Id. at 568.
48. Id. at 569.
49. Id. at 570.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/5
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Other courts have agreed that when the state has franchised the utility

to carry on a "clearly ...quasi-public function," 50 and/or is subject to an
encompassing network of regulatory statutes, ordinances, and administrative agencies,5 1 it acts under color of the law.52 But this determination is
not inevitable. The Seventh Circuit, in Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co.,5 found an insufficient nexus between the utility and the state where

the only connection between them was the filing of the utility's regulations
with the state public utility commission, noting that the state in no sense4
benefited from, encouraged, requested, or cooperated with the utility.

Similarly, the required relationship between the utility and the state was
lacking in Lucas v. Wisconsin ElectricPower Co.5 5 because the state gave the
utility "insignificant support" in terminating service to delinquent accounts."5
The Seventh Circuit, in deciding Kadlec and Lucas, emphasized that (1)
the utilities acted out of purely private economic motives,57 and (2) the
state did not benefit from the utility's terminations of service.58 And in
Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co.59 a Pennsylvania district judge relied on
both Kadlec and Lucas to hold there was no action under color of state law
where the only state involvement was a state public service commission
requirement that utilities impose penalities on customers for failure to pay

50. Bronson v. Consolidated Ed., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, (D. Kan. 1972), where
the court held that utilities often perform 'quasi-public functions" because
normally, the state grants privately owned public utilities a monopoly in supplying essential commodities. The court went on to say that the function utilities
perform is vital to society and thus the state regulates them in the public interest
because otherwise the state would have to perform their function. Therefore, the
court reasoned, privately owned utilities lose their private character and become
instruments of the state subject to constitutional restraint. Id. at 722. The court
emphasized the importance of KAN. STAT. ANNm. § 66-101 (1969) to its decision.
The statute provides, inter alia, that the Kansas Corporation Commission "is
empowered to do all things necessary and convenient for the exercise" of its
power, jurisdiction, and authority. See also Hattel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 350
F. Supp. 240 (D.Colo. 1972).
51. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F.2d 153, 164 (6th Cir. 1973).
52. Courts have set some limits on the state action in this area. "Only the
particular activity which comes under the umbrella of a state statute or state
authorized regulation constitutes state action." Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342
F. Supp. 241, 246 (N.D. Ohio 1972) aff'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). The
mere fact that a corporation is subject to some degree of state regulation, or is
granted a special right or privilege by the state, is insufficient to convert the
essentially administrative or business action of the corporation or activity into
state action. Id. at 244. See also Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451

(1952).

53. 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
54. Id. at 626.
55. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
56. Id. at 658. For support to be significant so that state action results, the
state must give aid, comfort, or incentive, real or apparent. Id. at 655. See Hay-

dock, Public Utilities and State Action: The Beginning of ConstitutionalRestraints,

49

L.J. 413 (1973).
57. Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1969).
58. Id.
59. 348 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973).

DENvER
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bills promptly and set forth clearly in their tariffs the exact conditions under
which the penalities could be imposed.60
V. STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITIEs IN MISSOURI

In deciding whether a Missouri utility is a state actor the Thrke standards must be applied. Ihrke is important because Missouri is 5diEighth
Circuit jurisdiction and because Ihrke has been well-received by' subsequent
courts faced with analogous problems.6' Ihrke requires a close look at Missouri regulatory practices.
Privately owned public utilities in Missouri are subject to regulation at
both the state and local level. Opportunities for local initiative afrparticularly strong. Many municipalities require that utilities obtAi business
licenses as a condition precedent to operation. Much more significant is the
broad and comprehensive power granted to local governments which authorizes cities, towns and villages to grant franchises to private' companies
rules, regulations, and
seeking to provide utility services "subject to such
62
conditions as shall be expressed [by] ordinance."
The city charter of the city of St. Louis illustrates the degree of regulation to which privately owned public utilities may be subjected. This
charter permits the board of aldermen to grant utility franchises "subject
always to the city's power of taxation and its authority to regulate rates,
quality of use, service, and products and methods of conduct and operation."0 3 It further provides that the grantee of a franchise for a public
utility "shall keep such reports of its finances and operatioh-,'s may be
prescribed by ordinance, and the city may at any time examin its records
and accounts." 4 Further, the board of aldermen "may regulateille charges
for the use, service or product . .. and establish whatever .rquirements

may be necessary to secure efficient use, service ot products." 5 Pursuant to
its charter 0 St. Louis places taxes on public utilities based on a percentage
companies, 7 telephone companies, 6 gas comof gross receipts of electrical
9 and water works. 70
panies,
Missouri public utilities are subject also to close' supervision by :. 72e
state administrative agency, the PSC. 71 The PSC has comprehensive powers

60. Id. at 958.
61. See, e.g., Hattell v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972)..
But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973).__ "
62. § 71.520, RSMo 1969.
63. St. L. Mo. City Charter, art. XIX, § 1 (1960).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 2.
66. Id. § 1.
67. St. L. Mo. Rev. Code § 152.030 (1960).
68. Id. § 153.050.
69. Id. § 155.010.
70. Id. § 156.020.
71. § 886.010, RSMo 1969. Note also that priva'te utilities as corporations
must get a certificate of incorporation prior to doing business in the state. Id. §
851.060.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/5
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over those public utilities subject to its jurisdiction. 73 Before a public utility
may operate in Missouri, it must obtain a certificate of convenience
and necessity. 74 The PSC only grants such certificates upon a showing
that the operation of a utility is convenient or necessary to the public
welfare.7 5 In effect, the PSC allocates territories to monopolies or to regu76
lated competitors.
There are two additional features of Missouri public utility regulatory
law which support a finding that privately owned utilities act under color
of Missouri law. The legislature has granted utilities the right to use public
property in providing utility services, 77 and certain public utilities are
granted the power of eminent domain, 78 a power traditionally reserved to
the sovereign.7 9 The granting of such powers indicates a degree of cooperation between the state and utilities sufficient to elevate the status of the
utility beyond that of a mere private entity.

72. The PSC is endowed by statute with general supervisory powers over
utilities to investigate and determine the quality of service provided by the utilities; to fix standards for the measurements of electricity, purity of water, quality
of sewage treatment, etc.; to prescribe uniform methods of keeping accounts,
records, and books; to inspect the property, facilities, equipment, and offices of
the utilities; and to examine the accounts, books, contracts, and records of the
utility and compel their production by subpoena duces tecum. § 393.140, RSMo
1969. The activities of utilities are subject to review by the PSC when the utilities
petition for rate increases (Id. § 393.150), or whenever complaints by subscribers
are submitted. Id. § 393.260. The PSC is empowered to examine the rules and
regulations of the utilities, and under proper circumstances it may prescribe
"the just and reasonable acts and regulations to be done and observed." Id.
§ 393.140(5). Pursuant to its statutory power, the PSC requires utilities to file
their rules and regulations as a part of their tariff schedules. Mo. PUB. SElv.
COMM'N GEN. ORER 20, R. 13. In addition, the management of the utilities is
under the scrutiny of the PSC and the right to issue stocks, bonds, notes, and
other forms of indebtedness is subject to PSC regulation. Id. at R. 11.
The termination of service by Missouri utilities is subject to regulation by
the PSC. § 383.180, RSMo 1969. The PSC requires 48 hours notice stating the
reason for the discontinuance before a subscriber's service can be cut off. Thus,
when a privately owned utility terminates a subscriber's service, it acts pursuant
to a regulation of the PSC.
73. See §§ 386.250, 393.140, RSMo 1969; State ex rel. Consumers Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 180 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. En Bane 1944).
74. § 393.170, RSMo 1969.
75. Id. See also State ex rel. Harline v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 343 S.W.2d 177
(K.C. Mo. App. 1960).
76. State ex rel. Consumers Pub. Serv. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 180
S.W.2d 40 (Mo. En Bane 1944).
77. § 393.010, RSMo 1969, which grants utilities power to lay conductors
for conveying gas, electricity, and water through the streets, alleys, and squares of
towns and to set poles, wires, etc., along public road, streets, and waters of the
state.
78. Id. §§ 393.020-.030.
79. Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, 479 F.2d 153, 164 (6th Cir. 1973);
Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932
(1967); Garrow v. United States, 131 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 765 (1942); United States v. Federal Land Bank, 127 F.2d 505, 508
(8th Cir. 1942).
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In summary, there appears to be sufficient state regulation of Missouri's
utilities to support a finding, under Ihrke, that the actions of at least some
utilities (particularly those in cities which have taken full advantage of
section 71.520) are under color of state law. The state benefits monetarily
in the form of increased franchise fees and tax revenues from the profits
that accrue to utilities from overcharges. This fact, coupled with the state's
grant to the utilities of the power of eminent domain and the right to use
public lands, demonstrates a unique partnership between the state and the
utilities that is a viable basis for considering the actions of the utilities to be
state action for 14th amendment purposes.
VI. DuE

PRocEss AND THE UTmrrY SnmscmE

A. In General
The significance of characterizing utility services as entitlements proferred under the aegis of state action depends on the applicable standards
of procedural due process. These standards will likely parallel due process
standards in related areas.
Minimal due process standards usually require that parties whose
property rights are adversely affected by state action be afforded notice and
an opportunity to be heard. These rights must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.80 Presumably, in the case of utility
services, notice and a hearing should be granted prior to the termination
of service. 81
The formalities and procedural niceties of the required hearing vary
in accordance with the importance of the interests involved.8 2 Although the
Supreme Court has yet to establish generic guidelines for due process
broadly applicable to all nonjudicial headings,8 the Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly8 4 did set forth the necessary elements for a pretermination hearing
regarding welfare benefits. Goldberg held that a pretermination hearing
need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, but that an
administrative proceeding is sufficient. 85 Goldberg essentially required
tendering notice that details the reasons for the proposed termination, and
an effective opportunity to defend, including the right to confront adverse
witnesses and present oral arguments and evidence. 86 The Court required the
hearing to be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of the welfare
recipient and that there be a right to counsel. 87 Finally, the Court required
that there be a procedure that would insure an impartial decision maker
whose decision would rest solely on the rules and evidence adduced at the

80. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
81. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
82. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
83. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402

U.S. 535, 542-43 (1971).

84. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

85. Id. at 266.
86. Id. at 267-68.
87. Id. at 269.
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hearing 88 and who would preserve an adequate record of the reason for
his ruling. 89
B. Alternative Procedures for Compliance with Due Process
Two approaches to public utility due process procedures have been
advanced. One model calls for the utility itself to provide, a forum with a
procedure analogous to that used in Goldberg administrative hearings. The
other suggestion is a Goldberg administrative proceeding provided by a
state agency.
1. Hearing Provided by the Utility
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 0 approved the use-of the approach
in Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co.91 In Palmer the district judge ordered 2 the
utility not to terminate service to customers without complying with the
following procedure: Prior to the termination of service an employee of
the utility must speak personally with the subscriber and inform him of
the intent to terminate service; if the subscriber disputes the reason for
termination (e.g., claims the bill has been paid), then the utility may not
terminate service for 24 hours. If the subscriber fails to contact the utility
within 24 hours service may be terminated; if the subscriber presents
defenses, they are to be heard by an employee of the utility with a minimum
rank of office manager. This employee is required to inquire into the factual
dispute and make a direct individual response to the subscriber explaining
the utility's position. 93 If this action does not resolve the dispute the subscriber may stay termination of service by posting a bond of the amount in
dispute. Final resolution is made by a higher company official or by litigation
commenced by the utility to collect the disputed amount.94
The Palmer procedure complies with most of Goldberg's due process
requirements. Adequate notice and a pretermination hearing are provided,
thereby protecting the subscriber from an erroneous termination. A decision
maker is provided, who, although not impartial in a judicial sense, is far
enough removed from the controversy to provide a degree of objectivity. 5
One court theorized that officials of utilities are qualified to serve as
impartial decision makers because a utility's incentive to sell services is at
least as great as their desire to collect past due accounts. 96 An additional
88. Id. at 270.
89. Id. at 271.
90. 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
91. 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
92. The order of the district court was summarized by the Sixth Circuit on
appeal. 479 F.2d at 159-60.
93. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970), in which the Supreme
Court approved as an impartial decision maker an official in the welfare department who had not participated in the initial determination of the case. The
implication is that a utility official may, if not involved in the dispute, serve as
an impartial decision maker.
94. Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 160 (6th Cir.
1973).
95. Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 64 (D. Minn. 1972).
96. National Foods v. Union Elec.,'494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973).
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incentive to impartiality is the official's awareness of the utility's potential
tort liability for wrongful termination of service. The Palmer procedure
appears to afford fair protection in a very practical manner.
A very important additional feature of Palmer is that it provides the
aggrieved party with an opportunity for judicial review prior to termination
of service. Moreover, the utility is given the burden of going forward with
the judicial action, thereby placing the burden of proof on it.
2. Hearing Provided by a State Agency
A second alternative is an administrative procedure conducted by a
state agency. Such procedures have been characterized as providing an
appropriate forum and assuring a meaningful opportunity to be heard in a
97
simple, inexpensive, informal, and flexible proceeding.
New York provides an example of the use of an administrative procedure
to provide an orderly and regularized process of dispute settlement. The
New York Public Service Commission procedure is two-staged. 98 The initial
stage provides an ombudsman-type complaint handling procedure.9 9 A
utility subscriber is granted the right to seek a hearing with the commission
by filing a complaint, either formal or informal, oral or in writing. 00 The
commission investigates the complaint, serving it on the utility, which in
turn must satisfy the subscriber or file an answer. 10 ' If the complaint is not
settled, the commission provides the opportunity for a conference-type
hearing at which the subscriber and utility are given the opportunity to
present evidence and to contest the other party's assertions before an impartial officer of the commission. 0 2 The commission's impartial hearing officer makes a determination of the dispute in writing and provides it to
the parties. 03
If the initial proceedings fail to resolve the dispute to the parties'
satisfaction, or if the informal ombudsman proceedings proves inadequate
to settle the dispute, the commission, by motion of the subscriber, utility,
or itself, may conduct a formal public hearing. 0 4

97. Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 64 (D. Minn. 1972).

98. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Opinion 73-16 (1973). The Public Service

Board of Vermont has issued proposed rules that follow a procedure similar to
that of New York. See Proposed General Order No.
regulating the disconnection of utility services. (July 31, 1973).
99. Id. at 5. See also 16 N.Y.C.R.R. I(B), § 11.2(b).
100. Id. at § 11.1.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at § 11.2(a).
Id. at § 11.2(b).
Id.
16 N.Y.C.R.R. I(B), § 11.2(c). The procedure for a formal hearing is

set forth in 16 N.Y.C.R.R. I (B), § 2.3. The rules provide that as a matter of

course complaints involving disputed bills in which termination of service is
threatened shall be resolved at a formal public hearing. Id., at § 11.2(c). The
commission may disclaim jurisdiction over the dispute if it deems a judicial reso-

lution of the dispute more appropriate, or if the dispute is subject to concurrent
administrative and judicial jurisdiction. Id. See also N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Opinion 73-16 at 7 (1973).
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In any case, pending resolution of a complaint the New York Public
Service Commission may provide the subscriber with interim relief in the
form of a stay of discontinuance of service.10 5 The commission is not
required, however, to stay termination of service if the complaint is frivolous
or designed primarily to delay payment for properly billed services. 00 To
insure that its system will be effective, New York has adopted rules that
require utilities to adequately publicize the complaint procedures'0 7 and
which modify the procedures by which the utilities process the complaints
of their subscribers.10s
VII. CoNcrLusIoN
Fourteenth amendment procedural due process requirements appear to
be satisfied by either a state administrative hearing procedure similar to
New York's, or a proceeding conducted by the utility consistent with Palmer.
Both alternatives have deficiencies. The establishment of a state administrative body such as the PSC to settle disputes between utility subscribers and
utilities can be criticized as creating another level of bureaucratic red tape.
Such an administrative body might run afoul of article II, section 1 of the
Missouri Constitution, which prohibits legislative bodies (including administrative bodies such as the PSC) from performing functions the constitution
reserves for the courts. 0 9
The Palmer method of internal resolution of disputes over bills will be
criticized as an instance of the fox guarding the hen house. The imprecise
nature of the due process protections afforded and the lack of a sufficient
impartial decision maker suggest some skepticism as to its effectiveness.
In any case the legislature should act to assure the public utility subscriber in Missouri inexpensive, fair, and quick pretermination relief. The
alternative to legislative action is almost certain to be judicial imposition of
a pretermination process, and the courts are not as qualified to study or
implement viable alternatives.
GARY L. MAYES

105. 16 N.Y.C.R.R. I(B), § 11.2(d).
106. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Opinion 73-16 at 9 (1973).
107. See, e.g., 16 N.Y.C.R.R. II(D), § 143.9; 16 N.Y.C.R.R. III(D), § 434.9;
16 N.Y.C.R.R. V(C), § 533.9; 16 N.Y.C.R.R. VI(C), § 631.10.
108. See, e.g., 16 N.Y.C.R.R. II(D), § 143.8.
109. The PSC arguably renders a money judgment when it issues an order
settling a dispute over a bill between a utility and its subscriber. "To determine
whether one person is entitled to recover money from another cannot be anything
but a judicial question, and as such must be determined by the courts. The Public
Service Commission is not, and under our Constitution cannot be a court." State
ex rel. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 303 Mo. 212, 259 S.W.
445, 447 (1924). The Missouri courts have emphatically held that the PSC "has
no authority to adjudicate and determine individual or personal rights ...because
under the Constitution the legislature has no power or authority to invest such
commission with juidicial powers." State ex rel. Rutledge v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
316 Mo. 233, 289 S.W. 785 (1926). See also State ex rel. Laundry, Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 327 Mo. 93, 34 S.W.2d 37 (1931).
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